First Amendment—Conditioning Public Employment on Political Affiliation Unrelated to Job Performance Held Unconstitutional by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 59 Issue 1 
January 1981 
First Amendment—Conditioning Public Employment on Political 
Affiliation Unrelated to Job Performance Held Unconstitutional 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Labor and 
Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
First Amendment—Conditioning Public Employment on Political Affiliation Unrelated to Job Performance 
Held Unconstitutional, 59 WASH. U. L. Q. 301 (1981). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss1/16 
This Recent Development is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University 
Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
Number 1] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
itself to the secondary effects problem.69 The Court, consistent with the
congressional preference for resolving disputes through the collective
bargaining process, relegated resolution of the issue to collective bar-
gaining tables. 0
The IL4 Court's deference to the collective bargaining process does
not appear to present an adequate solution to the difficult and sensitive
issues created by massive technological displacement of workers. Until
Congress enacts a statutory scheme, however, to confront the problems
generated by the technological displacement of workers, there appears
to be no adequate alternative to the ILA Court's holding.7'
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-CONDITIONING
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT ON POLITICAL AFFILIATION UNRELATED TO JOB
PERFORMANCE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507 (1980). When the Democrats gained control of the Rockland
County legislature in 1977, they appointed petitioner Branti to the posi-
tion of Public Defender to replace the Republican incumbent.' Upon
taking office, Branti issued termination notices to six of the nine assis-
tant public defenders,2 including respondents Finkel and Tabakman.
versus management. Here, one segment of labor seeks to take work away from another segment."
100 S. Ct. at 2324 n.I. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
The severity of the disruption on other bargaining units is intensified because the longshoremen
had, in prior collective bargaining agreements, permitted outside workers to perform the work
now claimed. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n (Dolphin Forwarding, Inc.), 236 N.L.R.B.
525, 526 (1978); International Longshoremen's Ass'n (Associated Transport, Inc.), 231 N.L.R.B.
351, 355 (1977) (Fanning, Chairman, dissenting). For a discussion of contractual abandonment of
claims, see International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Local 13 (California Cartage Co.),
208 N.L.R.B. 994, 996 (1974), enforcedmen. sub nom Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. NLRB, 515 F.2d
1018 (D.C. Cir. 1975); 90 HARv. L. REv. 815, 827 (1977). But see International Longshoremen's
Ass'n v. NLRB (Consolidated Express, Inc.), 537 F.2d 706, 712 (2d Cir. 1976).
69. See 100 S. Ct. at 2315 n.22.
70. See id at 2314, 2317. See also note 61 supra and accompanying text.
71. See generally International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 890, 893, n.ll
(D.C. Cir. 1979); Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§ 8(b)(4)
and8(e), 113 U. PA. L. Rv. 1000, 1041 (1965).
1. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 509 (1980).
2. Id at 509.
3. Respondent Tabakman was a registered Republican. Id Respondent Finkel changed
his party affiliation in 1977 from Republican to Democrat to enhance his chances of reappoint-
ment. The district court found that despite Finkel's change in political affiliation, the parties re-
garded him as a Republican during the period in issue. Id at 509 n.4.
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With one exception, the nine assistants who Branti intended to appoint
or retain were Democrats with Democratic sponsors.a Respondents
brought suit in federal district court to prevent Branti from terminating
their jobs. The trial court found that Branti discharged respondents
solely for their political beliefs, and issued a permanent injunction.5
The court of appeals summarily affirmed. 6 On certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed and held: Conditioning continued em-
ployment of a public employee upon political party affiliation when the
affiliation is not necessary for the effective performance of the public
office involved violates the first and fourteenth amendments.
Courts and commentators traditionally regarded public employment
as a privilege rather than a right.7 This distinction alone, however,
does not justify dismissal from a job for unconstitutional reasons.' The
first amendment,9 applicable to the states through the fourteenth
4. Manuel Sanchez, one of the assistants retained, did not have a registered party affiliation.
Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284, 1285 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). All nine of the appointees were
selected by Democratic town chairpersons or Democratic legislators in accordance with proce-
dures approved by the Democratic caucus. Those procedures excluded candidates with non-Dem-
ocratic affiliation from consideration. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. at 510 n.5.
5. 457 F. Supp. at 1285-86 n.4. The district court explained that the ruling required peti-
tioner to permit respondents to work as assistants and to pay them a normal assistant's salary.
Mere payment of salary would not constitute full compliance with the judgment. Id
6. No. 78-7494 (2d Cir. 1979). The court specifically held that the record supported the
district court's finding of fact. It also expressed "no doubt" that the district court "was correct in
concluding that an Assistant Public Defender was neither a policymaker nor a confidential em-
ployee." Id., slip op. at 4, quoted in Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 4 app., Branti v. Finkel, 445
U.S. 507 (1980).
7. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Adler v.
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), a 9db,
an equaly divided Court per cur/am, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
Justice Holmes expressed the concept in one of his celebrated aphorisms when he said, "[t]he
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAv. L.
REV. 1439, 1439-42 (1968) and cases cited therein. For a modem application of the right-privilege
distinction, see Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1020 (1972) (discharged city employee had no right to public employment).
8. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 605-06 (1967). These cases rejected the earlier doctrine expressed in Bailey v. Richardson,
182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aj7'dby an equally divided Courtper cur/am, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), and
Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), that because there was no right to a government
benefit, such as public employment, the benefit could be denied for any reason. See generall, Van
Alstyne, supra note 7.
9. U.S. CONsT. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
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amendment,10 protects the right to engage in political expression and
association."I A compelling governmental interest may limit this right,
but only if advanced in the least restrictive manner.' 2
Patronage has existed as a governmental practice in the United
States at least since the presidency of Thomas Jefferson.1 3 Although
patronage awards take many forms, 14 the most visible form is the dis-
tribution of government jobs based on political affiliation and loyalties.
Recipients of patronage positions serve at the whim of the political
party in control; thus wholesale purges following the inauguration of a
new party are commonplace.' 5
the press; or the rights of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
The incorporation of the first amendment into the fourteenth is generally dated from Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
11. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 114 (1976); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). See generally Emer-
son, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964).
12. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 94 (1976); Kusper
v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31-33 (1968); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 444 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464-66 (1958).
The Court has not made clear the precise test to be used in assessing the nature of the govern-
mental interest. A mere showing of a legitimate state interest will not justify encroachment.
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58 (1973). The interest must be paramount and of vital impor-
tance. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) (implying a test of strict scrutiny). There is some
authority for the proposition that political affiliation is a suspect classification, requiring a test of
the most exacting scrutiny, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("The criterion of political allegiance may have been added [to the list of suspect criteria] in
Williams v. Rhodes ...."). It should be noted, however, that Williams v. Rhodes, which held
that Ohio's differential ballot qualification tests for major and minor political parties were uncon-
stitutional, involved the direct exercise of the franchise. This right enjoys the highest status of first
amendment rights, and arguably differs from mere political affiliation. See generally O'Neil, Poli-
tics, Patronage and Public Employment, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 725, 730-33 (1975); Comment, Pa-
tronage Dirmissals: ConstitutionalLimits and Political Justi'fcations, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 317-
19 (1974).
13. For a history and analysis of patronage practices, see M. TOLCHIN & S. TOLCHIN, To THE
VICTOR (1971).
14. Patronage practices include such favors as construction and defense contracts, "banking
and insurance funds, and specialized treatment by.. .discretionary governmental agencies." Id
at 5-6.
15. O'Neil, supra note 12, at 726-29; Note, Political Patronage and Unconstitutional Condi-
tions: ,4 Last Hurrahfor the Party Faithful?, 14 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 720 (1973).
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In Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis 16 the Seventh Circuit be-
came the first court to give constitutional protection to dismissed pa-
tronage employees."7 Plaintiffs sued for reinstatement after the
Secretary of State dismissed them for failing to support the Republican
party. The court held that government officials could not discharge
nonpolicymaking employees solely for refusing to transfer political al-
legiance from one party to another. 18 The court recognized, however,
that a compelling state interest in conditioning employment on political
affiliation could justify the dismissal of policymaking employees.' 9
The Lewis court's reasoning did not gain full acceptance, 20 however,
until the Supreme Court addressed the issue of patronage dismissals in
Elrod v. Burns.2' Petitioner, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, replaced
non-civil service employees with members of his own political party
when the existing employees failed to obtain support from, or affiliate
with, that party. The plurality,22 relying on Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents23 and Perry v. Sindermann,2 4 held that public officials must re-
16. 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1975).
17. Two courts earlier failed to find any constitutional violation of a dismissed public em-
ployee's rights. In Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1021
(1972), the court held that public employment was a privilege rather than a right, and therefore
terminable at will. The court in American Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v. Shapp,
443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971), similarly held that the employees had no right to their jobs, and
further, had waived any constitutional rights by obtaining their jobs through the patronage sys-
tem. "IT]hose who. . . live by the political sword must be prepared to die by the political sword."
Id at 536, 280 A.2d at 378. For a discussion of the constitutionality of patronage dismissals prior
to these cases, see generally Schoen, Politics, Patronage, and the Constitution, 3 IND. LEGAL F. 35
(1969).
18. 473 F.2d at 574, 576.
19. The court suggested that considerations of personal loyalty could justify the employment
of political associates in certain positions. Although the court did not define "policymaking," it
said that janitors, elevator operators, and school teachers were not policymaking employees. Id
at 574.
20. See Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974) (discharged liquor store employee
who chose patronage position waived right to complain), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005 (1975); Indi-
ana State Employees Ass'n v. Negley, 357 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Ind. 1973) (Lewis decision was a
narrow holding, limited to nonpolicymaking employees), aq'd, 501 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1974).
21. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
22. Eirod was a plurality decision. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall,
wrote the plurality opinion. Justice Stewart filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Black-
mun. Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Powell also filed a dissenting opin-
ion in which the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice Stevens did not participate.
23. 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (statute making Communist party membership prima facie evidence
of unfitness for public school teacher position held unconstitutional).
24. 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (unconstitutional to refuse to renew untenured teacher's one year
contract because of teacher's public criticism of college administration). Perry and Keyishian to-
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strict patronage dismissals to policymaking employees.25 Only a vital
governmental interest can justify an infringement of nonpolicymaking
employees' first and fourteenth amendment rights.26 The Elrod plural-
ity found that the implementation of the new administration's policies
as sanctioned by the electorate was a vital governmental interest.27 Be-
cause nonpolicymaking employees lack the power to thwart these poli-
cies, however, the plurality concluded that dismissal based solely on an
employee's political affiliation is an unjustifiable infringement of the
employee's constitutional rights.28 The concurring Justices declined to
join the plurality's discussion of the patronage system.29 Rather, the
concurrence held that government officials cannot discharge nonpoli-
cymaking, nonconfidential employees for their political beliefs.3"
The Elrod standard proved unmanageable. The distinction between
policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions is unclear in the middle
ranges of employment hierarchies.3 1  Furthermore, lower courts dis-
gether stand for the proposition that the government cannot condition the retention of jobs on
unconstitutional demands that it could not make directly.
25. The Court did not explicitly define "policymaking," but suggested three criteria for eval-
uating jobs: The nature of the responsibilities, whether the individual acts in an advisory capacity,
and whether he formulates plans to implement broad goals. 427 U.S. at 367-68.
26. Id at 362.
27. Id at 367. The plurality rejected the petitioners' argument that wholesale dismissals of
the out-party's employees could be justified because such employees have no incentive to work
efficiently and may thwart the new administration's efforts. A less intrusive means, discharge for
cause, is available. Id at 366. The plurality also was not persuaded that the elimination of pa-
tronage practice would bring about the demise of political parties. The democratic process could
function well without the practice, and perhaps even better, by eliminating the entrenchment of
one party to the exclusion of others and the impairment of constitutional rights. Id at 368-70.
The plurality stressed that governmental interests should not be confused with interests of parti-
san organizations. Only the former may impinge on constitutional rights. Id at 362.
28. Id at 367.
29. Id at 374 (Stewart, J., concurring).
30. Id at 375 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Perry v. Sindermarm, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)).
The concurring opinion constitutes the holding of the Court. "When a fragmented Court decides
a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding
of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judg-
ments on the narrowest grounds .... .' Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quot-
ing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). This has been referred to as the "least
common denominator" test. Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), af'd, 598
F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979), aft'd, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
31. Compare DiPiro v. Taft, 584 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978) (fire chief characterized as policymak-
ing employee), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 914 (1979) and Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825 (7th Cir.)
(deputy city attorney characterized as policymaking employee), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977)
and Alfaro De Quevedo v. De Jesus Schuck, 556 F.2d 591 (Ist Cir. 1977) (director of office of
criminal justice characterized as policymaking employee) and Rivera Morales v. Benitez de Rex-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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agreed whether the nonconfidentiality aspect of employment was ancil-
lary to the concept of policymaking or was a separate test in itself.32
In Branti v. FinkeP33 the Court refined the contours of the Elrod stan-
dard. The majority, in an opinion written by Justice Stevens, reiterated
the arguments of the Elrod plurality, but recognized that labeling a job
policymaking or confidential often fails to resolve the issue of whether
political affiliation furthers a compelling state interest. 34 Instead, the
test is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affilia-
tion is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the
public office.35
The Court agreed with the district court's finding that respondents
were neither policymaking nor confidential employees.36 Applying the
new test, the Court found that an indispensible element of an assistant
public defender's job is the ability to act independently of the govern-
ach, 541 F.2d 882 (Ist Cir. 1976) (assistant secretary of education characterized as policymaking
employee) and Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1976) (state museum regent characterized
as policymaking employee) and Dyke v. Otlowski, 154 N.J. Super. 377, 381 A.2d 413 (1977) (su-
pervisor of senior citizens activities characterized as policymaking employee) and Ause v. Regan,
59 A.D.2d 317, 399 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1977) (county hospital supervisor characterized as policymak-
ing employee) with Rivera Morales v. Benitez de Rexach, 541 F.2d 882 (Ist Cir. 1976) (field co-
ordinator for staff development project characterized as nonpolicymaking employee) and Vincent
v. Maeras, 447 F. Supp. 775 (S.D. Ill. 1978) (communications technician characterized as nonpoli-
cymaking employee).
32. Loughney v. Hickey, 480 F. Supp. 1352, 1362 (M.D. Pa. 1979). "The courts split over
whether the test is conjunctive or disjunctive, ie., whether an employee who is 'confidential' or
'policymaking' is beyond First Amendment protection, or whether the employee must be 'confi-
dential' and 'policymaking.'" Id (emphasis in original).
Following the district court opinion in Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
aJ'd, 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979), aft'd, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), and Rosenthal v. Rizzo, 555 F.2d 390
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 892 (1977), the Loughney court found the test to be conjunctive. A
confidential employee is one who stands in a confidential relationship to the policymaking proc-
ess. But see Stegmaier v. Trammell, 597 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1979) (deputy circuit clerk is confi-
dential employee, although not policymaking, and subject to dismissal); Catterson v. Caso, 472 F.
Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (even if county attorney is not a policymaking employee, he is confi-
dential employee with respect to his clients, the county officers, and so subject to dismissal).
33. 445 U.S. 507 (1980). Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion. He was joined by Jus-
tices Brennan, White, and Marshall (the Elrod plurality), Justice Blackmun (who concurred in
Elrod), and Chief Justice Burger (who dissented in Elrod). Justice Stewart concurred in Elrod but
dissented in Branti.
34. The Court gave several examples. A Republican election judge could legitimately be
discharged for changing party registration, even though his job was neither policymaking nor
confidential. On the other hand, a state university football coach formulates policy and has access
to confidential information, yet his party affiliation is irrelevant. Id at 518.
35. Id
36. Id at 511. The district court found that respondents had little, if any, policymaking
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ment and to oppose it in litigation.37 Under these circumstances,
conditioning the jobs on allegiance to the dominant political party un-
dermines, rather than promotes, effective performance of the public of-fice. 38
Justice Stewart, in dissent, argued that Elrod was inapplicable be-
cause respondents were confidential employees, much like lawyers in a
private law firm. 3 9 Justice Powell, in a separate dissenting opinion,
found the new standard "vague and sweeping. '40  He argued that pa-
tronage advances substantial governmental interests.41 These interests
outweigh respondents' first amendment rights.42 Justice Powell also ar-
gued that the decision might impair the right of local voters to structure
their form of government.43
The majority correctly analyzed the issue of patronage dismissals
from a constitutional standpoint, thus avoiding the polemics of pa-
responsibilities. In addition, they did not occupy a confidential relationship to the policymaking
process of the office. 457 F. Supp. at 1291.
The Court rejected petitioner's argument that Elrod is limited to dismissals resulting from an
employee's failure to capitulate to political coercion.
Such an interpretation would surely emasculate the principles set forth in Elrod. While
it would perhaps eliminate the more blatant forms of coercion described in Elrod, it
would not eliminate the coercion of belief that necessarily flows from the knowledge that
one must have a sponsor in the dominant party in order to retain his job.
445 U.S. at 516.
37. Id at 519 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979)).
38. Id at 519.
39. Id at 521 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
40. Id at 524 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist joined the Powell dissent and Justice
Stewart joined as to this first part.
41. Id at 528 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell stated that patronage appointments help
build stable political parties. Political parties, in turn, serve governmental interests by donating
time and money to candidates for election and by carrying out the policies of elected officials.
Strong political parties thus ensure democracy. This is essentially the same argument he advanced
in his Elrod dissent. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 376-89 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting).
The argument that patronage strengthens political parties and thus ensures democracy is falla-
cious. Democracy is determined by the constitutional right to vote, not by the existence of a two
party system or partisan politics. See Schoen, supra note 17, at 83-101.
42. 445 U.S. at 526 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell also argued that the majority was creating
a national civil service system by judicial fiat. Id at 534 (Powell, J., dissenting).
43. Id at 533 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell explained that the voters of Rockland
County could have elected the officials, but instead gave their legislators a representative proxy to
appoint the officials on the basis of party affiliation. The Court's decision will require the voters to
elect the officials to fill the positions on a partisan basis. Chief Justice Burger also recognized this
concern in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. at 375-76 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
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tronage. 44 The question presented to the Court was not whether pa-
tronage was good or bad, but rather whether its use justified an
infringement of first amendment rights.
The Court's test regarding patronage dismissals is appropriate. The
newly refined test will allow courts to confront directly the constitu-
tional issue of employment conditioned on party affiliation without
having to categorize the positions by applying artificial labels. The test
promotes direct analysis of the conflict between the governmental inter-
est in uninhibited hiring and the public employees' constitutionally
protected interest of freedom of association and demands governmental
justification for infringement of constitutional rights.
The Brand test, however, imposes a heavier burden on the hiring
authority.45 It is arguably more vague than the Elrod policymaking-
confidentiality test. A demonstration that party affiliation is an appro-
priate requirement for employment is less precise than a demonstration
that policymaking and confidentiality are aspects of a particular job.4 6
In addition, the Court gave few guidelines for application of the new
test.47
The Brand decision will result in greater job protection for a greater
number of public employees. The test covers most, if not all, employ-
ees protected under the Elrod test.48  Moreover, Brand protects those
44. There is no unanimity of opinion on the benefit of patronage to government. See M.
TOLCHIN & S. TOLCHIN, supra note 13, at 9-10, 307-11.
45. Once the plaintiff establishes that party affiliation was the reason for the dismissal, the
employer must demonstrate that party membership was appropriate to the discharge of the plain-
tiff's responsibilities. Such a burden may not be difficult to carry for those positions immediately
subordinate to the elected official, for those employees may well be in a position to implement
party goals. The farther down the hierarchical employment ladder one progresses, however, the
more tenuous the connection becomes between party affiliation and the effective performance of
the job.
This burden may force states to alter their employer-employee relationships and to adopt civil
service-type standards that outline permissible grounds for dismissal. Such standards would pro-
vide greater opportunity to justify dismissals absent appropriate relevancy of party affiliation to
the job. The burden imposed on employers does not necessitate implementation of a national civil
service system: Local standards are sufficient. 445 U.S. at 534 (Powell, J., dissenting).
46. The content given to the words "policymaking" and "confidential" is debatable, however,
as evidenced by the post-Elrod decisions. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
47. The Court's examples of the football coach and the election official, see note 34 supra, are
of little aid because they are obvious. Clarification is necessary for application of the test in closer
situations.
48. In Aufiero v. Clarke, 489 F. Supp. 650 (D. Mass. 1980), a post-Brand decision, an em-
ployee who was arguably neither policymaking nor confidential was dismissed. The court reached
the correct decision under Brand, but applied the wrong reasoning. Plaintiff, a former Republican
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss1/16
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policymaking and confidential employees for whom party affiliation is
an inappropriate job requirement from the effects of patronage.49 The
Branui decision thus reinforces the first amendment rights of patronage
employees and provides lower courts and hiring authorities with a
more direct means of constitutionally analyzing the competing inter-
ests.
patronage appointments secretary (although his official title was Chief of Bureau for District Of-
fices in the Massachusetts Department of Corporations and Taxation), was dismissed upon the
inauguration of a Democratic governor. The plaintiff established a prima facie case that his dis-
charge was because of his political activity and party affiliation. Id at 652. The defendant did not
satisfy the burden of showing a nonpolitical justification for the discharge. Id at 653. It was clear
that political affiliation had no relevance to the performance of the duties of Bureau Chief. Id
By all rights the plaintiff should have won. The court, however, became confused and stated that
plaintiff's position "was related to his political association, ie., patronage appointments, and
might well be deemed protected if it did not involve the very conduct that was itself condemned in
Elrod . Burns and Branti v. Finkel. It is doubtful if even under those cases the same conduct can
be both constitutionally condemned and constitutionally protected." Id at 653-54.
The conduct, of course, would not be protected if it related to his political association. The
defendants clearly erred in not showing that party affiliation was appropriate to the effective per-
formance of plaintiff's job, whatever his official title was.
49. It is possible that employees denied constitutional protection in the post-Elrod decisions
would be protected under the Brani test. See DiPiro v. Taft, 584 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1978) (fire chief),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 914 (1979); Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825 (7th Cir.) (deputy city
attorney), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977); Alfaro De Quevedo v. De Jesus Schuck, 556 F.2d 591
(lst Cir. 1977) (director of office of criminal justice); Rivera Morales v. Benitez de Rexach, 541
F.2d 882 (lst Cir. 1976) (assistant secretary of education); Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385 (10th
Cir. 1976) (state museum regent); Dyke v. Otlowski, 154 N.J. Super. 377, 381 A.2d 413 (1977)
(supervisor of senior citizen activities); Ause v. Regan, 59 A.D.2d 317, 399 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1977)
(county hospital supervisor).
The Brand decision could wreak havoc with other aspects of the patronage system. Challenges
to patronage hirings could come under the Brani test because requiring party affiliation for em-
ployment infringes constitutional rights as much as requiring party affiliation for continuation of
employment. 445 U.S. at 522 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting). Two post-Branti decisions support this
proposition. In Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1980), the court held that Brant!
sweeps wider than threatened or actual dismissals, and includes practices that are the substantial
equivalent of dismissal. In Delong a former state director of the Farmers Home Administration
was demoted to "program assistant." The court remanded the case to the district court and or-
dered it to consider plaintiffs subjective and objective expectations and reliance upon continua-
tion of particular assignments in determining constitutional protection. In Aufiero v. Clarke, 489
F. Supp. 650 (D. Mass. 1980), the court said:
A distinction might be made between the hiring done by the plaintiff here, and the firing
done by the defendants in Elrod and Branti. But these are obviously two sides of the
patronage coin. Clearly, the inducement to suppress one's political philosophy and
choice of party affiliation operates equally forcefully on the person who seeks a job or
promotion as it does on one who desires to retain one.
Id at 654 (citing Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. at 522 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
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